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Introduction
One of the better ways to celebrate next year’s fiftieth anniversary of Gideon 
v. Wainwright,1 in which the Supreme Court held that poor defendants accused
of felonies in state court are constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel, 
would be to force every lawmaker, judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney 
in the United States to read the last major work of a man who believed the 
legacy of Gideon is not an unequivocally positive one. In The Collapse of American 
Criminal Justice, the late Bill Stuntz argues that the cure for the pathologies of 
the criminal justice system lies in restoring local democratic control over crime 
policy, better funding public defenders, and buttressing equal protection 
doctrine, rather than in the continued focus on the “vast network of procedural 
rules the Supreme Court has crafted since the early 1960s” (302). Stuntz argues 
that the fetishization of so many formalistic procedures that, in his view, at best 
indirectly ensure fairness of trial and sentencing outcomes has rendered trials 
too expensive, which in turn has driven prosecutors and lawmakers to seek 
ways to avoid trial and force pleas through draconian sentencing schemes, a 
skewed focus on easily detected urban drug crimes mostly committed by racial 
minorities, and ever-expanding substantive criminal law. The result of this 
assembly-line justice, Stuntz argues, is both excessive punitiveness in the form 
of racially disparate mass incarceration and excessive leniency in the form of 
underprosecuted violent crime in poor communities.
Stuntz humbly admonishes that he is neither an empiricist nor an historian,2 
and it is true that many of his causal claims start with phrases like “It seems 
more than a coincidence that . . . .” Moreover, other recent scholarship 
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. Stuntz’s humility is legendary. As a student in his criminal procedure class, I recall him
politely but with good humor requesting on the last day that we dispense with the tradition
of clapping for one’s professors as if they were demigods, “bounding gazelle-like from the
classroom.”
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seems to call into question Stuntz’s claims about prosecutors’ focus on drug 
crimes to the detriment of violent crime clearance rates,3 and the impact of 
excessive sentencing on incarceration rates.4 Nevertheless, Stuntz’s origin 
story and reform proposals make intuitive sense and seem to square with the 
realities of modern criminal practice. In any event, the power of the book is 
not as a definitive statement of cause-and-effect followed by a comprehensive 
prescriptive agenda, but rather as a moral challenge to the rest of us to continue 
the conversation after he is gone.
In the pages that follow, I hope to accomplish two goals. First, I briefly 
describe Stuntz’s descriptive claims and proposals for reform, trying to point 
out some of what makes it so powerful but also raising a few doubts and 
qualifications. One of those qualifications is that Stuntz’s primary arguments 
are very much anchored in a world that is gradually disappearing:  a world in 
which scientific evidence plays a minor role, at most, in criminal prosecutions. 
My second goal, accordingly, is to examine how Stuntz’s arguments play out 
in a new world in which complex scientific evidence such as DNA testing is 
becoming increasingly central to criminal adjudication. That world is briefly 
mentioned but little explored in Stuntz’s book, but it turns out that his 
largest themes—in particular the need to focus on providing defendants with 
procedural protections that are substantively meaningful in challenging this 
new form of proof and that take innocence seriously—will be as important in 
that world as in the one Stuntz describes.
How Did We Get Here?
Anyone who has listened to NPR recently is likely aware that America has 
the highest rates of incarceration in the world, that our population of prisoners 
is grossly skewed in terms of race and class, and that our imprisonment rates 
have increased even as national crime rates have dropped over the last 20 
years. What is less well known, if Stuntz’s claims are right, is that we are also 
in a period of excessive leniency in which violent crime is underprosecuted in 
poor urban communities, that our system is rigged to coerce guilty pleas with 
high average sentences from both factually innocent and guilty defendants, 
and that the very definition of factual guilt has expanded over the years in a 
way that is profoundly antidemocratic.
Outside the insular worlds of academia and the criminal defense bar, many 
find it difficult to believe that a factually innocent person would plead guilty. 
3. For example, only about 20 percent of offenders in 2006 were in prison for drug crimes.
James Forman Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 21, 46–47 (2012). Meanwhile, huge racial disparities exist in violent crime
prosecution rates, id., which would suggest that violent crime in poor communities is
prosecuted quite often, assuming that violent crime is mostly intraracial.
4. See John Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Admissions and Populations, at 18, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990508 (Jan. 23, 2012) (determining from previously unreviewed
data that a large increase in felony filings per arrest, rather than factors such as number
of arrests or length of sentence per admission, is primarily responsible for the increase in
incarceration from 1980 to the present).
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Stuntz’s account is both comforting and disturbing in that it will hopefully 
reveal to all—including non-lawyers, who will find the book fascinating and 
eminently readable—why it would be absurd to assume otherwise. 
Defendants often are told that if they do not accept a plea deal, they will be 
charged with numerous overlapping state and/or federal offenses carrying 
draconian maximum penalties, mandatory minimums, habitual offender 
enhancements, or profound collateral consequences such as lifetime sex 
offender registration or deportation. While the defendant has a theoretical 
right to take the case to trial, his lawyer might advise him that his chances of 
winning are slim, or cannot be adequately assessed by the time the plea deal 
expires. Prosecutors often set plea deadlines early, sometimes even before the 
preliminary hearing or indictment, rendering nearly impossible a full factual 
investigation by counsel of the charges and state’s proof before advising the 
client on the chances of winning at trial. These concerns are heightened for 
the vast majority of defendants who are indigent; appointed counsel’s 
allocation of time to factual investigation rather than other types of advocacy 
is often skewed by a crushing caseload in the hundreds and, in some 
jurisdictions, a fee structure that pays by the case rather than the hour.5
Even with respect to defendants who are factually guilty of some crime, harsh 
sentencing schemes, overcharging, and expansive substantive law ensure that 
plea deals often end in disproportionate sentences determined unilaterally by 
prosecutors. Moreover, the behavior that counts as “factual guilt” has been 
dramatically expanded under modern substantive criminal law. As Stuntz 
points out, vaguer common-law definitions of crimes, which left significant 
discretion to juries in determining what type of conduct is wrongful, have 
given way to precisely defined statutory offenses that leave little room for jury 
discretion.
Stuntz notes that in the Gilded Age, crime and imprisonment rates were 
both very low and relatively stable (17, 133). What changed, and why? To 
summarize Stuntz’s major theses in a paragraph is difficult given the epic 
nature of the historical account he offers, which begins with the French 
Revolution and continues through Reagan’s War on Drugs. But four key links 
in the chain are that (1) Warren-Era decisions have rendered trials much more 
expensive; (2) the high cost of trials, the high crime rate of the 1960s–1970s, and 
the perception that courts were too protective of guilty defendants created a 
perfect storm driving lawmakers and prosecutors to pursue measures intended 
to make convictions cheaper and easier, such as high sentences and broader 
definitions of crimes; (3) the racial disparity in incarceration is largely due 
both to discrimination, which continues unabated under current ineffectual 
equal protection law, and to a law enforcement focus on cheap and easy urban 
drug prosecutions as a proxy for more difficult violent crime prosecutions; 
and (4) the minorities most affected today by the instabilities in current crime 
5. See, e.g., National Legal Aid and Defender Association, In Defense of Public Access to Justice
(2004) at 30, available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Evaluation/la_eval.
pdf.
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and imprisonment rates lack political capital, unlike the wave of European 
immigrants who became part of the political mainstream in the early 20th 
century and defeated American’s previous and more transparent war on drugs, 
Prohibition.
A Way Out?
While the book’s title portends a depressing story of systemic failure, the 
ultimate thrust of the book is hopeful. Stuntz proposes a mix of political and 
doctrinal changes that would work symbiotically to produce low violent crime 
rates and humane law enforcement policies. While I question the scope and 
efficacy of some of his solutions, it is difficult to argue with the central thesis of 
the book that a greater focus on substantive justice and democracy will be an 
important part of any successful reform effort.
On the democracy front, Stuntz suggests that we shift decision-making 
over prison funding to the urban communities most affected by mass 
incarceration, and decision-making over police funding to the state and 
county actors who tend to be more punitive. The goal is decreased reliance on 
prisons and increased reliance on policing, a change Stuntz shows is proven 
to reduce crime. The shift should also, he predicts, render sentencing reform 
more politically feasible. Stuntz further suggests increasing funding to public 
defender offices to allow them to spend more time on factual investigation and 
not focus their limited time primarily on filing boilerplate motions to enforce 
procedural rights.6 
Stunz also proposes enhancing juror diversity by drawing jury pools from city 
rather than county demographics and eliminating peremptory strikes, arguing 
that such measures would be more effective than relying on defense counsel to 
litigate difficult-to-prove claims of racial bias in the selection process. Yet even 
if jury pools in a highly diverse city like Oakland, California were city-based 
rather than county-based, they would be disproportionately white because of 
strict jury exclusion laws that disproportionately affect minority jurors. Any 
attempt to increase juror diversity must also address disenfranchisement laws.7
It is tempting to be pessimistic about whether such political reforms are 
remotely realistic, given the account of some scholars that those in power 
6. Of course, increased funding will not stop counsel from filing motions; so long as a procedural 
right is recognized and arguably violated, they have a constitutional and professional 
obligation to do so. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (deeming failure 
to file a meritorious motion to suppress deficient performance for “ineffective assistance of 
counsel” purposes).
7. In Alameda County (which includes Oakland), first-time felony crack cocaine convictions 
for personal possession, unlike those for powder cocaine or methamphetamine, result in 
the citizen’s lifetime exclusion from jury service absent the granting of a “Certificate of 
Rehabilitation,” which requires, among other things, proof of seven years of rehabilitation. 
See Cal. Penal Code §§ 4852.01-03.
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cling to crime policy as a tool of social control8 or racial subjugation,9 and 
the fact that sentencing reform has failed even in majority-minority cities like 
Washington, D.C.10 But perhaps there is also room for optimism. New York’s 
strict Rockefeller drug laws, notably passed with the support of many African 
American leaders,11 were repealed in 1994, and as Stuntz discusses at length, 
Prohibition failed in spite of—indeed, perhaps because of12—its potential as a 
means of targeting immigrant populations. 
On the doctrinal front, Stuntz first suggests a return to vaguer common-
law language to describe various crimes, and calls for courts to “reestablish” 
the concept of mens rea (303). Yet such small steps, even if politically feasible, 
would have limited effect if a jurisdiction kept other expansive and commonly 
invoked doctrines such as the felony murder rule, which imposes nearly strict 
liability on felons for killings during the course of and in furtherance of the 
felony, and so-called Pinkerton liability, which imposes nearly strict liability on all 
co-conspirators for foreseeable acts of other conspirators in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.13 Perhaps Stuntz would view these doctrines as non-pathological 
because, though punitive and contrary to traditional mens rea requirements, 
they might not be the product of hasty, undemocratic attempts to enable 
cheap and easy prosecutions for the sake of avoiding trials. 
The second, and more controversial, doctrinal reform Stuntz suggests 
is to ensure just trial and sentencing outcomes through equal protection 
and substantive due process doctrine rather than more indirectly through 
enforcement of the procedural guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments. Stuntz acknowledges that “the undoing of” Warren Era 
decisions is an unrealistic goal (302). Even if such an “undoing” were possible, 
it surely would not increase the number of trials so long as severe sentencing 
and easily proven crimes remain on the books. Prosecutors, many of whom 
receive merit increases based on conviction rates,14 would still have an incentive 
to encourage pleas and to avoid a possible loss at trial by overcharging or 
threatening lengthy prison time. Instead, Stuntz suggests that courts shift 
their focus to facilitating equal protection arguments against discriminatory 
8. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed 
American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
9. See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow (New Press 2010).
10. See James Forman Jr., supra note 3, at 47.
11. See id.
12. See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1969, 2024 (2008) (“Politicians 
and judges alike worried obsessively about the chronically inconsistent enforcement of the 
Eighteenth Amendment, and about what those enforcement patterns said about the rule of 
law in America.”).
13. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
14. See, e.g., Jessica Fender, DA Chambers offers bonuses for prosecutors who hit conviction 
targets, Denver Post, Mar. 23, 2011, available at http://www.denverpost.com/news/
ci_17686874.
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and coercive law enforcement tactics. Under current law, selective prosecution 
claims and other fairness-based arguments are often dead losers because 
defendants do not have enough data to be entitled to a hearing, but need to 
have a hearing to discover the data. 
To end this “legal Catch-22” (120), Stuntz suggests forcing jurisdictions 
to keep data relevant to such claims. If the defendant in Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes15 had access to comprehensive sentencing statistics listing the offense, 
underlying facts of offense, and race of offender, he could have argued that the 
prosecutor’s use of a habitual offender statute to threaten life in prison for an 
$88 forged check, a strategy employed solely to force a five-year plea deal, was 
illegal given that no other defendants faced a similar sentence on such facts. In 
drug prosecutions, defendants could argue that their overly harsh plea deals 
do not match their drug crimes and are proof of pretextual motive (301). In 
the coerced confession context, “a requirement that interrogation sessions 
be taped so that judges could see (or at least hear) for themselves how the 
relevant actors behaved” (212) would deter abusive tactics and make it easier 
to prove involuntary confessions violative of due process (all without relying 
on Miranda doctrine, which according to Stuntz perversely provides legal cover 
for coercive tactics and rewards only sophisticated suspects). 
Similarly, in Duncan v. Louisiana,16 teenager Gary Duncan might have proven 
that had he been white, he never would have been prosecuted in 1966 for 
the two-year offense of simple battery based on an alleged “slap” of a white 
youth who was harassing Duncan’s 12-year old cousins for attending a recently 
desegregated school. Stuntz points out that it was the racist prosecution in 
Duncan that seems most unjust, and not so much the procedural error for 
which the case is most famous: the denial of a jury trial for a non-petty offense. 
Indeed, the reversal on that ground is not what ultimately saved Duncan; 
before his trial on remand, the legislature capped the sentence for battery at 
six months, which would have made his second trial a bench trial as well.17
Two doubts might be raised, however, about Stuntz’s attack on the Warren 
Court and embrace of equal protection doctrine. First, while Stuntz is surely 
right, as he has argued in previous work, that “[p]rocedural regulation 
inevitably encourages substantive overreaching,”18 such overreaching might 
also occur in response to changes he suggests. It might first come in the form 
15. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
16. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
17. After remand, a federal district court enjoined the prosecution on grounds that the state’s 
case was brought in “bad faith” and for the purpose of “harassment.” Duncan v. Perez, 445 
F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971). Stuntz laments that “no body of law arose from the [later] decision” 
(369 n.72).
18. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 819 
(2006). Interestingly, Stuntz does not point to widespread substantive overreaching in the 
federal system before the 1970s, even though the Bill of Rights has been binding in federal 
prosecutions since the Founding.
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of perjured testimony. After Mapp v. Ohio19 made the exclusionary rule binding 
on states, the number of “dropsy” cases in which police claimed to have seen 
defendants throw what looked to be drugs or weapons from their person 
significantly rose.20 Similarly, if Gary Duncan’s primary remedy were to stem 
from showing through data that officials would not have brought the case on 
such facts had he been white, officials might be tempted to embellish the facts 
beyond a mere slap. In the confession context, police might be tempted to 
coerce confessions before taping begins, then have suspects repeat their words 
on tape.21 Overreaching could also come in the form of “leveling up.” In a case 
like Bordenkircher, under a more robust equal protection regime, officials might 
be tempted to start charging more defendants under the habitual offender 
law to foreclose claims that such prosecutions are unusual. And in drug cases, 
officials might pursue higher drug sentences across the board to rebut a charge 
that a high sentence suggests that the prosecution is a pretextual substitute for 
a more difficult violent crime prosecution. 
Second, recognizing (as Stuntz does) that certain basic procedural rights 
such as the right to jury, counsel, and protection against coerced confessions 
are likely necessary to preclude wrongful convictions (81), it is not clear why 
the Warren Court was wrong to interpret them as binding on the States. While 
an all-white jury in Louisiana’s notorious Plaquemines Parish in 1966 may well 
have convicted Duncan anyway, a fairly selected jury might have acquitted, 
or at least would have been more likely to acquit than a judge beholden to 
segregationist officials. The legislature’s desperation to reduce the maximum 
sentence immediately before Duncan’s remand suggests as much. But that 
premise seems to suggest that Duncan was not necessarily wrongly decided, 
other than its overly narrow grounds. While reasonable people might disagree 
about the legitimacy of incorporation via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause,22 that broader debate is not one that Stuntz directly invokes.
Ensuring Substantive Justice in an Era of Science-Based Prosecutions 
Stuntz briefly gives a nod to the coming era of science-based prosecutions, 
describing “the increasing range and accuracy of forensic evidence, including 
DNA” as “the greatest advance in criminal procedure of the past generation” 
(227). To be sure, DNA testing promises to dramatically enhance both 
systemic accuracy and crime clearance rates, although its potential to do the 
latter is hampered by testing backlogs and the perverse policy of many state 
19. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20. See, e.g., Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan 
Police Practices 1960–62, 4 Crim. L. Bull. 549, 549–50 (1968) (noting that “dropsy” testimony 
was much more prevalent after Mapp).
21. While a “question-first, warn-later” strategy might be illegal under Miranda, see Missouri 
v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring), judges might view the second 
confession—assuming they knew about it—voluntary under a “totality of circumstances” due 
process test.
22. See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058–88 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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laboratories to prioritize testing based on when a case is up for trial, rather 
than the seriousness of the offense.23 But a reported DNA match may still 
be unreliable evidence of guilt in any given case, based on interpretive error, 
contamination, faulty statistics, or reasons for innocent presence such as DNA 
“transfer.”24 At the same time, DNA’s perceived infallibility and complexity 
make it more difficult to uncover such errors through investigation and trial 
challenges. Unlike eyewitnesses, for example, DNA results do not break 
down under cross-examination, and jurors have trouble assessing the results’ 
probative value, which is typically a function of complex statistical analysis. 
Meanwhile, lesser forensic methods of dubious reliability are still admitted 
against defendants. A scathing 2009 report by the National Academy of 
Sciences concluded that several routinely used forensic methods, including 
latent fingerprint analysis, are lacking in basic validation as a tool for reliably 
identifying suspects.25 The report noted that most methods other than DNA 
testing were developed solely for law enforcement purposes, and have not been 
meaningfully scrutinized by the broader scientific community.26 The report 
suggested that courts have too leniently admitted such methods under the 
so-called “Frye” test,27 which asks not whether the science is actually reliable, 
but simply whether there is “consensus” in the relevant scientific community 
about its reliability. Not surprisingly, the Innocence Project reports that faulty 
forensic methods contributed to wrongful convictions in over 50 percent of 
reported DNA exonerations.28
While Stuntz mentions scientific evidence only in passing, his call for a 
greater focus not on specific, formalized procedures for their own sake but 
on meaningful procedures that ensure substantive justice is equally as critical 
in an era of DNA as it was for Gary Duncan in 1960’s Louisiana. Take first 
the fact that courts are still admitting unvalidated forensic methods, and the 
23. Thus, perversely, DNA testing in many jurisdictions is used more for confirmation of an 
existing suspect in drug and property crimes rather than to investigate unsolved rapes 
and homicides. See Andrea L. Roth, Database-Driven Investigations: The Promise—and 
Peril—of Using Forensics To Solve “No-Suspect” Cases, 9 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 421, 
421–22 (2010) (citing Kevin J. Strom & Matthew J. Hickman, Unanalyzed Evidence in 
Law Enforcement Agencies: A National Examination of Forensic Processing in Policing 
Departments, 9 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 381 (2010)).
24. See, e.g., Erin E. Murphy, The Art in the Science of DNA: A Layperson’s Guide to the 
Subjectivity Inherent in DNA Typing, 58 Emory L.J. 489 (2008); William C. Thompson, 
Tarnish on the ‘Gold Standard’: Understanding Recent Problems in Forensic DNA Testing, 
The Champion (Jan./Feb. 2006), available at http://www.newkirkcenter.uci.edu/Thompson/
Tarnish.pdf.
25. See National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences. Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States: A Path Forward (National Academy Press 2009).
26.  Id. at 183–84.
27.  See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28. See http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Unreliable-Limited-Science.php.
385
Frye test—still followed in a significant number of states29—is not an effective 
filter. Heeding Stuntz’s call to interpret the Due Process Clause in a way that 
focuses on outcome accuracy and protecting innocent defendants, one solution 
might be to recognize a basic due process right not to be convicted based on 
unreliable scientific evidence, i.e., to “constitutionalize” the reliability-based 
admissibility standard for expert testimony set forth in Daubert v. Merrill-Dow 
Pharmaceuticals.30 
On the other hand, when it comes to DNA testing, a method in which the 
science is generally well-validated but where case-specific errors are possible 
and difficult to detect, protection against “unreliable” pseudo-science is not 
sufficient. What an innocent defendant needs to meaningfully challenge faulty 
DNA testing and other seemingly hyper-reliable but still fallible “second-
generation” forensic methods31 is an attorney who understands enough about 
the potential errors to consult an expert; money to hire experts; money and 
access to biological material to facilitate possible testing or retesting; access to 
the government’s procedures, analysts, and statistical databases to be able to 
assess the accuracy of the testing results and match statistics;32 and a factfinder 
who will understand the probative value (or lack thereof) of the test results 
and the defense’s attacks on those results. 
Here, Stuntz’s wariness of “freezing [specific] procedures in place” (79) at 
the expense of more directly protecting the substantive rights ostensibly served 
by those frozen procedures is validated yet again. With respect to confrontation, 
Stuntz notes that current law contemplates live testimony rather than scientific 
evidence. He specifically targets Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,33 in which the 
Court held that the state, upon a defendant’s request, must introduce drug 
analysis reports through the live testimony of the chemists who authored the 
reports, rather than simply admitting such reports under a hearsay exception. 
The decision was a follow-up to Crawford v. Washington,34 in which the Court 
held that confrontation is a categorical procedural right applicable to all 
“testimonial” hearsay, rather than a more flexible right to confront evidence 
29. At least 13 states still follow Frye, and another four have a hybrid standard that does not fully 
embrace the reliability-based test of Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 
(1993). See Kenneth W. Waterway & Robert C. Weill, A Plea for Legislative Reform: The 
Adoption of Daubert To Ensure the Reliability of Expert Evidence in Florida Courts, 36 
Nova L. Rev. 1, 25 (2011).
30. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness 
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 353, 360 (2003) (calling for 
constitutionalization of Daubert in death penalty sentencings).
31. See Erin E. Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second 
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 721 (2007).
32. The FBI currently refuses, for example, to allow researchers access to anonymized profiles in 
the national DNA database to test the accuracy of the FBI’s purported match statistics.  See 
Dan Krane et al., Time for DNA Disclosure, 326 Science 1631–32 (2009).
33. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
34. 541 U.S 36 (2004).
Book Review: The Collapse of American Criminal Justice
386	 Journal of Legal Education
deemed potentially untrustworthy. Stuntz argues that Melendez-Diaz actually 
“undermines” the advance of science (227): if chemists are spending their 
time testifying for the sake of a likely uneventful cross-examination rather 
than conducting analyses that would solve cases, innocent suspects and crime 
victims ultimately suffer.
While there are reasons to believe this particular concern is unfounded,35 
Stuntz’s broader point is well taken that courts’ exclusive focus on cross-
examination has obscured the rationale underlying the right of confrontation. 
But the answer need not be to view the right as trivial in the modern age, or 
to return to the pre-Crawford standard that treated the existence of the right as 
turning on the perceived trustworthiness of the evidence. Indeed, it is the very 
fact that DNA testing results are assumed to be so trustworthy, but may well 
not be, that make them resistant to challenge except through investigation by 
a zealous advocate for the defense. Rather, the answer should be for courts to 
recognize that the right of confrontation is not historically or logically limited 
to cross-examination and physical confrontation, but—as David Sklansky 
has suggested—encompasses “the broader ability of an accused to test and to 
challenge the state’s proof.”36 Correctly viewed as such, the confrontation right 
would entitle a defendant to the type of access to government-controlled data 
and material needed to meaningfully investigate DNA testing results. 
In the same respect, the right to jury—if interpreted merely as a right to 
a venire of impartial citizens from a fair cross-section of the population—
may be cold comfort for a defendant whose rebuttal of the state’s proffered 
forensic evidence requires some level of scientific competence on the part of 
the factfinder to understand or credit. Scott Brewer has written of a possible 
“intellectual due process” norm—that is, a requirement that “factfinding 
regarding matters that are the special epistemic province of expert scientists, 
must be conducted in a coherent and rational manner.”37 Perhaps the Due 
Process Clause should be interpreted to allow a criminal defendant to insist 
upon a scientifically trained factfinder or trial by judge rather than jury38 where 
necessary to ensure a nonarbitrary verdict.
35. For example, California and Illinois required live testimony from chemists long before 
the Court required it, and the cost of drug trials did not skyrocket. Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), Reply Brief for Petitioner Luis E. Melendez-Diaz 27-28, 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_
preview_briefs_pdfs_07_08_07_591_PetitionerReply.authcheckdam.pdf. One reason is 
that defendants often waive the right; after all, the government’s case generally becomes 
more persuasive when the jury hears from a live scientist rather than a hearsay report.
36. David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 67, 71–72 (2009).
37. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 Yale L.J. 
1535, 1676 (1998).
38. The Supreme Court has thus far upheld as constitutional the requirement that defendants 
secure permission from the government before insisting upon a bench trial. Singer v. United 
States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). 
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Finally, the right to counsel—if interpreted merely as a right to an appointed 
attorney—means little without low enough caseloads and appropriate fee 
structures to facilitate spending time on forensic investigation, as well as 
adequate funding to allow meaningful training, hiring of experts without 
undue resistance from judges protecting tight court budgets, and testing or 
retesting of forensic material as needed. Stuntz suggests that courts, rather than 
setting specific “budget lines” (299), provide incentives for state legislatures to 
create their own funding solutions. This suggestion seems reasonable, so long 
as legislatures take into account the particular pressures on indigent defense 
counsel created by the influx of complex scientific evidence in criminal trials.
In the end, Stuntz’s call for more substantive justice, democracy, and mercy 
is well reasoned, well timed, and, one hopes, will be well received by those 
with the power to enact change. In his essay “Law and Grace” written shortly 
before he died, Stuntz writes that we, like Dr. Martin Luther King, should 
“fight for the chance to embrace” our enemies.39 The lessons of The Collapse of 
American Criminal Justice—in teaching that we all have more in common than we 
imagine, are all guiltier than we imagine for the injustice that surrounds us, 
and are all capable of doing better—give us little moral excuse to do otherwise. 
As Stuntz would say, “both sides are us” (312).
39. William J. Stuntz, Law and Grace, 98 Va. L. Rev. 367, 384 (2012).
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